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Abstract
This paper analyzes employment growth in Belgian multinational enterprises’ headquarters 
relative to their affiliates.  We find that headquarters have on average 2.5% more employment 
growth than their affiliates. When they go through restructuring headquarters reduce employment 
by 4.4% less than their affiliates and affiliates located further away from their headquarters 
suffer more.  This effect almost doubles for firms that operate in manufacturing.  
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1. Introduction 
Globalization has changed the nature of production drastically resulting in an increased 
number of global firms and increased international fragmentation of production. While much of 
the literature so far has documented that multinational enterprises tend to pay higher wages, are 
more productive and generate technological spillovers, far less attention has been devoted to the 
process of employment creation and destruction by multinationals
1. The purpose of this paper is 
to compare the employment performance of multinational enterprises at their headquarters with 
their foreign subsidiaries.  
This is of particular relevance in view of the recent global crisis as especially multinational 
enterprises that are embedded in a global supply chain have been forced to speed up 
restructuring, which is often associated with increased employment reductions.  However, casual 
observation suggests that such restructuring efforts are not always proportionately distributed 
across all plants of the same multinational enterprise. For instance the recent restructuring of 
Opel at General Motors implied closure of one plant in Belgium, employment reductions in 
Germany, while expansion in South Korea. Politicians are also concerned about the issue as is 
clear from a recent interview with Lord Mandelson in the Wall Street Journal
2, where he states 
that "Denuding a country of any headquarters has important consequences" , especially for the 
“associated investment in local charities and infrastructures”.
The observation that firms which are geographically dispersed transmit shocks differently 
across plants has recently been investigated for the US by Landier, Nair and Wulf (2007).  In 
particular, they find that geographically dispersed firms are less employee friendly and that there 
is a bias towards protecting proximate employees when the firm engages in divestments. 
Similarly, Cappariello, Federico and Zizza (2009) use Italian multinational enterprises to show 
that home-country effects of FDI tend to be biased in favor of the headquarters investing firms.  
There are various reasons why geographic dispersion and corporate decision making might 
be related. First, imperfect information and agency costs may result in a home bias. In particular, 
if monitoring and control of valuable assets, such as R&D, is difficult, multinational enterprises 
may want to concentrate their most valuable assets at or close at headquarters to avoid ‘leakage’ 
(e.g. Chang and Taylor, 1999; Petersen and Rajan, 2002).  Second, there may be certain 
advantages investing more at home due to better knowledge about language, culture and local 
customs than at more distant locations (e.g. Brakman and Garretsen, 2008). A third reason is that 
managers are more concerned about proximate employees, with whom they have more frequent 
social interactions. In addition, managers may also care more about their social standing in 
                                                            
1 A number of papers have analyzed how employment is substituted between affiliates of the same multinational in 
response to wage cost differentials.  Braconier and Ekholm (2000), Gordon, Mataloni and Slaughter (2001), Konings 
and Murphy (2006) find that employment substitution in response to wage cost differentials between plants occurs 
mainly between similar plants, located in high income countries, rather than between high income and low income 
countries. 
2 Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2010, page 2. 3 
 
geographically concentrated firms. Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) and Glaeser 
(2004) recognize a relation between proximity and social interactions in studies of individual 
decisions such as residence in cities and aggregate outcomes such as crimes. 
To analyze employment performance of multinational enterprises we make use of a panel 
dataset of Belgian firms active in manufacturing as well as in non-manufacturing. The data 
include information of total employment at headquarters as well as employment at their 
affiliates. By analyzing what happens within the same multinational firm, we can control for all 
the unobservable specificities that may affect the strategy of the particular multinational 
enterprises. Furthermore, we control for shocks affecting plants of the same multinational 
enterprise. This allows us to control for potential selection issues. 
Our results indicate that the employment performance at headquarters is superior than at their 
affiliates. Furthermore, we find that multinational enterprises that engage in restructuring protect 
more the employment at headquarters than at their affiliates. Finally, we  also find evidence that 
restructuring hurts most in affiliates located further away from their headquarters.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the data and the 
econometric approach we pursue. Section 3 provides and discusses the results and section 4 
concludes.
2. Data and Econometric Approach 
Our data are derived from a commercial database named Amadeus, collected by Bureau van 
Dijck. The data consists of company accounts of European companies for which at least one of 
the following criteria is satisfied: total turnover or assets at least $12 million, or total 
employment of at least 150. The database is organized by country with records for firms within 
each country. In addition to the financial and operational information of the company, the 
records include information on whether the company is owned by another company and whether 
it has an ownership stake in another affiliate. Information on direct and on indirect ownership is 
available. In addition, the name and a unique identification number of the parent company and its 
affiliates is available. We will restrict our analysis to companies which have headquarters in 
Belgium and affiliates elsewhere in Europe. We focus on Belgian multinational enterprises as all 
incorporated companies in Belgium are required, by law, to submit full company accounts to the 
Central Bank. We define a headquarter as a global ultimate owner with at least 50% direct 
ownership in its affiliates. 
We have information for 1996 through 2005 and we retrieve all companies for which 
unconsolidated accounts were available for the Belgian parent headquarters and its affiliates 
located elsewhere in Europe. Matching parent companies to foreign affiliates yields an 
unbalanced panel of 447 Belgian parents and 3020 affiliates over 10 years. This results in 4 
 
roughly 23,000 firm-year observations. Table 1 shows the country distribution of affiliates in our 
panel, where each parent has an average of 25 affiliates. The parents are clustered around some 
of the major cities in Belgium, being Antwerp, Brussels and Ghent, and their foreign affiliates 
are mainly located in France, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. The data 
cover firms active in manufacturing (about 30% of the sample) and non-manufacturing. We 
provide summary statistics in table 2, where the variable of interest is employment. Headquarters 
employ on average more people, have more sales, higher total assets and have a higher average 
employment growth than their affiliates 
 
  










Austria  32  0.011 Ireland 12  0.004
Belgium  1,469  0.486 Italy 63  0.021
Bulgaria  1  0.000 Liechtenstein 1  0.000
Suisse  24  0.008 Lithuania 1  0.000
Czech Republic  31  0.010 Luxemburg 6  0.002
Germany  202  0.067 Latvia 2  0.001
Denmark  26  0.009 Netherlands 209  0.069
Estonia  2  0.001 Norway 17  0.006
Spain  94  0.031 Poland 40  0.013
Finland  10  0.003 Portugal 3  0.001
France  510  0.169 Romania 30  0.010
United Kingdom  171  0.057 Republic of Serbia 1  0.000
Greece  10  0.003 Russia 3  0.001
Croatia  5  0.002 Sweden 33  0.011
Hungary  6  0.002 Slovakia 6  0.002
Source: Amadeus & authors' calculations 5 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variables     Headquarters Affiliates Total
Number of firms     447 3,020 3,467
% in manufacturing    0.28 0.296 0.294
Employment  Mean  205.341 139.532 149.740
  Std. Dev.  885.111 1120.075 1087.206
Employment growth  Mean  0.047 0.032 0.034
  Std. Dev.  0.340 0.443 0.428
Total assets   Mean  130,817 89,771 90,334
  Std. Dev.  507,725 1,727,842 1,594,836
Sales  Mean  90,334 38,369 46,684
   Std. Dev.  332,922 260,273 273,852
Source: Amadeus & authors' calculations 
Notes: Total assets & sales in thousands of euro 
Figure 1 shows the average evolution of employment growth for parents and their affiliates. 
To avoid attrition bias, we only report in Figure  1 employment growth for a balanced sample of 
firms that we observe over the entire sample period 1996-2005. Figure 2 shows the same, but 
only for firms active in manufacturing. The pattern in both Figures are comparable: the 
employment growth remains quite stable for the headquarters, whereas affiliate employment 
starts with a positive growth rate, but starts to decrease towards the end of our observation 
period.6 
 
To analyze the evolution of employment in multinational headquarters relative to their 
affiliates we will use a standard firm level employment growth equation, where we take into 
account that various affiliates may belong to the same multinational enterprise. By controlling 
for the multinational fixed effects , , we are able to capture various unobservable factors, such 
as similar technology or management practices that is shared by the same MNE across its 
affiliates. It also controls for unobservable self-selection effects. To estimate whether 
headquarters behave differently in terms of their employment decisions we control in our 
specification for a headquarter dummy, headq, equal to 1 if the firm is a headquarter and zero 
else. This results in the following specification for firm i, belonging to MNE j in year t, located 
in country c and n denoting employment: 

 	  

 
     
       ( 1 )  
In (1) we take into account that firm level employment is persistent over time by adding 
lagged employment and 
 is a white noise error term.  When we subtract from both sides 
lagged employment (1) boils down to estimating a standard firm level employment growth 
equation, controlling for lagged size, which will form the basis of our analysis
3.
                                                            
3 Similar approaches have been used in the firm growth literature, see for instance Sutton (1997); Konings (1995).7 
 
3. Results
3.1. Basic Results 
Table 3 reports the baseline results, where in column (1) we pool both manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing firms together. All equations include year dummies and standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity within the same multinational enterprise. From the first column in 
Table 3, we can note that employment growth in headquarters is on average 2.5% higher than in 
its corresponding affiliates.  Note also that large firms on average grow less than small firms, a 
standard result in the firm growth literature.
To check for asymmetric responses in employment growth we distinguish in columns (2) and 
(3) between multinational enterprises that grow as a group versus those that decline as a group. 
We consider that the group grows if total employment in all the affiliates and the headquarter of 
a particular multinational increased on average for the period 1996-2005. A group declines if the 
reverse holds. Interestingly, in both cases headquarters’ employment growth outperforms that of 
its affiliates, but the effect is only half as strong when the group grows as a whole compared to a 
multinational group that declines over the sample period. From column (3) we can note that 
multinationals that on average are declining do so less intensively in its headquarters than in its 
affiliates. In contrast, when there is expansion, the increase in employment is more moderate at 
headquarters. The results in table 3 are based on an unbalanced panel of Belgian MNEs. Some 
firms we only observe for a few consecutive years, while others we observe for the full sample 
period. The attrition in the data is mostly related to missing observations due to differences in 
reporting requirements across countries. To check whether this attrition would bias our results 
we ran the same regression for a balanced panel for which we observed data for the full 10 year 
sample period. We report these results in table A1 in appendix 1. While the overall headquarter 
dummy remains positive, it only is statistically significant for MNEs that decline. And the 
coefficient is comparable to the one reported in table 3, column (3). Headquarters have on 
average 4% less employment decline than their affiliates. 8 
 
Table 3: Basic Results: All sectors 
  (1) 
All observations 
(2)
Group grows  
(3) 
Group declines 




  (0.00381) (0.00422) (0.00639) 
  










  (0.0121) (0.0166) (0.0322) 
N  18787 16215 2572 
*, **, *** reports significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for 
group clusters in parentheses. Year dummies are included in all regressions. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 repeat the same analysis, but for multinational enterprises for which their 
headquarters’ activities are in manufacturing versus those in non-manufacturing. Note that their 
affiliates can either be active in manufacturing,  non-manufacturing or both. Comparing the 
results in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the main result is driven by firms active in manufacturing.  
From table 4 it is clear that the effect of headquarters on employment growth now more than 
doubles. Furthermore, in declining multinationals, i.e. those going through restructuring, the 
effect is stronger and even 8%. In contrast, in table 5, the non-manufacturing firms, the 
headquarter effect is small and statistically not significant different from zero.  
 











  (0.00855) (0.0103) (0.00803) 
  










  (0.0248) (0.0323) (0.0667) 
N  5465 4668 797 
*, **, *** reports significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for 
group clusters in parentheses. Year dummies are included in all regressions.  
  9 
 











  (0.00373) (0.00409) (0.00880) 
  
Headquarter Dummy  0.00409  0.00191 0.0336 






  (0.0172) (0.0193) (0.0298) 
N  13322 11547 1775 
*, **, *** reports significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for 
group clusters in parentheses. Year dummies are included in all regressions.  
3.2. Does distance matter? 
In order to check whether geographic dispersion matters as suggested by Landier, Nair and 
Wulf (2007) we repeat our analysis but add the log distance of the affiliate to the headquarters. 
We do this by computing the kilometers distance between the two as we have information on the 
region where the affiliate is located. The average distance of the affiliates from headquarters in 
our sample is 1,100 km.  
Table 6 and 7 reports results for which we split the sample into two categories. Table 6 
reports the results for which the MNE is not restructuring, while table 7 shows the results for the 
MNE that undergo restructuring. Restructuring is defined as before, where we consider a MNE 
to restructure when the average annual employment growth of the entire MNE group is shrinking 
during the entire sample period. 
While our earlier results related to headquarters remain robust for the group of MNEs not 
going through restructuring, the headquarter effect turns statistically insignificant, but still   
positive, in the group of MNEs that restructures. Moreover, we find that distance matters. In 
table 6, for the MNEs that do not restructure, i.e. those that overall expand, distance has a 
positive effect on employment growth, while the opposite holds for those that restructure. In 
other words, when MNEs expand they seem do so more in their headquarters and in affiliates 
that are more distantly located. This is consistent with the idea to explore new market 
opportunities when demand is rising. But it is also those further located affiliates that suffer more 
when a MNE is reducing overall employment., especially for the MNE that is restructuring as is 
clear from table 7.  In particular, we find a strong and statistically negative effect of distance 
with an elasticity of distance estimated at 0.038 in manufacturing.  
While the effect of distance is statistically significant, the effect of headquarters is no longer 
significant in table 7. This can be explained by the correlation between distance and 
headquarters. Since Belgium is a small country, with Brussels only 100 km away from the border 10 
 
of France, Germany and the Netherlands, nearby locations, such as those in France or Germany, 
where a relative large fraction of the affiliates are located, may pick up the headquarter effect. 
The effect of distance plays more likely a bigger role for distant locations.
To check this we make a distinction between affiliates located in the same country as the 
headquarter, Belgium, versus affiliates abroad. About 50% of the affiliates in our sample are 
located in Belgium. The institutional setting of those affiliates is the same and the proximity to 
headquarters may also be important especially when monitoring is important or when control 
over intangible assets matters. In table 8 for the full sample and table 9 for manufacturing we 
therefore show results where in addition to a headquarter dummy, we also include a dummy 
equal to 1 if the affiliate is based in Belgium and zero else. We find that the effect is similar to 
the effect of distance. In particular, focusing on firms that restructure, we find that in addition to 
a positive headquarter effect (3
rd column of table 8 and 9) also affiliates located in the same 
country as the headquarter, Belgium, suffer less from restructuring. Moreover, the coefficients 
are similar in magnitude. This is evidence consistent with theories that indicate that geographic 
dispersion and proximity to headquarters matters for employment restructuring. Our data, 
however, do not allow us to distinguish between different theories that are consistent with this 
pattern, such as reasons of control of intangible assets or social interactions and social capital or 
both.











  (0.00419) (0.0102) (0.00409) 
   
Headquarter Dummy  0.0326
** 0.0857
*** 0.0115 
  (0.0140) (0.0254) (0.0175) 










  (0.0275) (0.0565) (0.0302) 
Observations  16215 4668 11547 
*, **, *** reports significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for 
group clusters in parentheses. Year dummies are included in all regressions.  
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  (0.00642) (0.00905) (0.00880) 
  
Headquarter Dummy  0.0172 0.0211 0.0220 
  (0.0273) (0.0501) (0.0320) 
  
Log(Distance)   0.0293
***  0.0387
***  0.0155 






  (0.0566) (0.106) (0.0863) 
Observations  2572 797 1775 
*, **, *** reports significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for 
group clusters in parentheses. Year dummies are included in all regressions.  











  (0.00373) (0.00426) (0.00638) 
  
Headquarter Dummy  0.0189 0.00883 0.0929
*** 
  (0.0127) (0.0136) (0.0326) 
  
Belgian affiliate   0.00707  0.0187
* 0.0832
*** 






  (0.0166) (0.0185) (0.0263) 
Observations  18787 16215 2572 
*, **, *** reports significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for 
group clusters in parentheses. Year dummies are included in all regressions. 
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  (0.00863) (0.0104) (0.00852) 
  




  (0.0220) (0.0233) (0.0589) 
  
Belgian affiliate  0.00220  0.0229 0.115
*** 






  (0.0286) (0.0354) (0.0643) 
Observations  5465 4668 797 
*, **, *** reports significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for 
group clusters in parentheses. Year dummies are included in all regressions. 
4. Conclusions
This paper analyzed employment growth in multinational enterprises, where we 
distinguished between employment growth in headquarters versus employment growth in their 
affiliates. To this end we used a panel data set of Belgian income statements of headquarter firms 
matched to their affiliates.  By analyzing what happens within the same multinational firm, we 
can control for all the unobservable specificities that may affect the strategy of the particular 
multinational enterprises. Furthermore, we are able to control for shocks affecting plants of the 
same multinational enterprise and hence this allowed us to control for potential selection issues. 
Our results indicate that the employment performance at headquarters is better compared to 
their affiliates. Furthermore, we find that multinational enterprises that engage in restructuring 
protect more the employment at headquarters than at their affiliates. Finally, we  also find 
evidence that restructuring hurts most in affiliates located further away from their headquarters. 
While this paper has not tested explicitly for theories that explain such a home bias in 
employment when MNEs restructure, our results are consistent with some of the recent theories. 
These include theories of imperfect information and agency costs which can explain a home bias 
for employment in MNEs as well as theories that focus on social capital and social interactions to 
explain the home bias for employment. 13 
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Appendix 1 











  (0.00438) (0.00463) (0.0120) 
  
Headquarter Dummy  0.0147 0.00761 0.0461
** 





  (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0380) 
N  9324 7911 1413 
*, **, *** reports significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for 
group clusters in parentheses. Year dummies are included in all regressions.